Democratic constitution-making: reflections on the European experiment by Fossum, John Erik & Menéndez, Agustin José
www.ssoar.info
Democratic constitution-making: reflections on the
European experiment
Fossum, John Erik; Menéndez, Agustin José
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Fossum, J. E., & Menéndez, A. J. (2005). Democratic constitution-making: reflections on the European experiment.
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 34(3), 249-262. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-61015
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Nicht-kommerziell) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Democratic Constitution-Making  Reflections on the European Experiment 249
John Erik Fossum (Oslo) / Agustín José Menéndez (Oslo)
Democratic Constitution-Making –
Reflections on the European Experiment
Mit der Erklärung von Laeken setzte die erste umfassende Debatte über eine Verfassung für Europa ein.
Eine wichtige Frage ist, ob dies bereits einem konstitutionellen Moment in einem kritisch-normativen
Sinn gleichkommt. Zwar können aus dem Laeken-Prozess normative Standards destilliert werden, die
Komplexität des europäischen politischen Systems aber erfordert eine Anpassung unserer Konsti-
tutionalisierungsmodelle, um den Anforderungen der Demokratie genüge zu tun. Der vorliegende Bei-
trag verweist auf die Spannung zwischen der Idee eines konstitutionellen Moments und dem Konzept der
demokratischen Repräsentation und schlägt zur Lösung ein normatives Modell des deliberativen Konsti-
tutionalismus vor.
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1. Introduction
Europeans are well-versed in constitutional
grammar. The citizens of the old continent can
regard themselves as the authors of their national
(and, when applicable, regional) constitutions.
Further, it is also quite some time since Euro-
pean Community law first began to be read and
constructed in a constitutional key. This implies
of course that Europeans are also subjected to
(and allegedly, authors of) European constitu-
tional norms.
But knowledge of a grammar does not nec-
essarily mean proper grasp of a language. Al-
leged but unconfirmed authorship can be expe-
rienced as stark subjection. Many analysts have
asserted that the present process of reform of
the constitutional basis of the European Union
is, to stay within the metaphor, not so much a
critical test of Europeans constitutional lan-
guage proficiency but a test of the very pros-
pects for a European democratic constitution.
To the sceptics, national constitutional gram-
mars do not  and cannot  add up to a Euro-
pean constitutional language. The EUs unique-
ness (which some also see as its main merits)
prevents it from entering the constitutional ter-
rain proper. To the optimists a European consti-
tution is not only entirely possible, but also
within reach. Many analysts have depicted
Laeken as Europes constitutional moment. By
implication, they have not only borrowed the
terminology and the normative standards from
the national constitutional settings, but also
claim that the EU is actively involved in trans-
posing these into its own constitutional struc-
ture.
How to navigate within this set of contra-
dictory positions? One take is to consider the
Laeken process more closely, and to keep in
mind that what is at stake is ultimately what it
means to write a constitution for the Union. In
clear contrast to previous instances of constitu-
tion-making, which failed to spark a constitu-
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tional moment,1  Laeken has ushered in the first
continent-wide debate, on the issue of a Euro-
pean constitution; the question then is whether
this could be said to amount to Europes consti-
tutional moment in a critical normative sense.
To address this we first seek to distil out the
core lessons we can derive from the Laeken
experience. This serves to clarify which norma-
tive standards are relevant through reconstruc-
tion of those that actually informed the process.
We find that the standards from normative
theory are adequate, but that the complex Euro-
pean setting and experience throw up several
thorny issues here: how can such a process be
organised, so as to comply with democratic
norms? Can it at all be representative?
More precisely, our concern here is to shed
light on how the tension between the idea of a
constitutional moment and the notion of demo-
cratic representation can be resolved. A demand-
ing normative conception of the constitution
characterises it as the set of fundamental norms
of a given legal order which have been deliber-
ated and decided by all the members of the po-
litical community; in short, by We the People.
This might seem, at first glance, to exclude rep-
resentative mechanisms from constitutional de-
liberation and decision-making; or, at least, to
downplay their importance, as they would seem
marginal in comparison to the intervention of
We the People. In this article, we claim that this
is overly simplistic, as it is evocative of a ro-
mantic (and misleading) characterisation of con-
stitutional moments as decisionistic instances,
in which a pre-existing people (perhaps even
pre-politically forged) enacts the fundamental
law in one stroke. This is not only at odds with
the present (and lengthy) European-wide proc-
ess of constitution-making, but with any accu-
rate reconstruction of national constitutional
moments. When bereft of the romantic fram-
ing, these also emerge as more complex and
multi-faceted than what has tended to be as-
sumed.
On such a basis, we claim that constitution-
making should be conceived of in procedural
terms, as a procedure through which democratic
legitimacy is ensured by means of a series of
demanding and repeated tests, such set up as to
ensure the existence of a collective will in sup-
port of new or amended fundamental norms. It
is the demanding character of such a procedure,
and the intervention of both strong2  and gen-
eral publics, and the complex interactions be-
tween them, that enables such procedures to de-
cide upon the fundamental norms of the politi-
cal community.3
The remainder of the chapter is divided into
three parts. First, we examine in some detail
what the recent process of European constitu-
tion-making has contributed to our normative
understanding of constitution-making. This re-
sults in five core lessons. Building on these, in
the next part we put forth our normative model
of deliberative constitution-making, which por-
trays constitution-making as a procedure which
is long, but not eternal, and always circum-
scribed to a given number of months, and
through which the existence of a constitutional
common will is tested through actions and in-
teractions between institutional and general pub-
lics. The third section holds the conclusion.
The resultant normative model can serve as
the key yardstick against which to assess both
whether the EU can be said to have embarked
on a constitutional moment, as well as it also
serves as a set of critical tests to establish the
democratic quality of such a process, whether
we end up deeming the present one a constitu-
tional momentor not.4
2. European Constitutional Lessons
The Constitutional Treaty (shorthand for the
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe)
was signed, and opened to ratification, on 29
October 2004. Its four parts and more than four
hundred articles have the vocation of becoming
the fundamental law of the EU. But we are far
from there yet. At the time of writing, Europe-
ans have just embarked on a complex and con-
voluted process of national ratification of the
Constitutional Treaty. It is uncertain whether the
Constitutional Treaty will be ratified by all the
Member States. If not what happens next is
shrouded in uncertainty, and so is the fallout:
whether rejection would lead to abandonment
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of the constitutional project; whether it will en-
ter into force only in the Member States that
have ratified it; or whether it will open up a new
constitutional process.
Despite such profound uncertainties, there
is no doubt that the process through which the
Constitutional Treaty was forged, hereafter re-
ferred to as the Laeken process, is a worthy ob-
ject of study unto itself. It can, and in our view,
is best seen, as a major constitutional experi-
ment, whether or not it bears constitutional fruit.
Europeans have, after all, not only engaged in a
substantive constitutional debate about the con-
tents of the EUs material constitutional norms,
but they have also entered into a meta-constitu-
tional debate on the very idea of constitution:
what it is and how it can be written. In this sec-
tion, we will aim at distilling out five of the most
important lessons that can be learned from the
reconstruction of the Laeken constitution-mak-
ing process. They concern (a) the relationship
between constitution and democracy; (b) the
limits of the constituent power; (c) the neces-
sarily procedural character of constitution-mak-
ing; (d) the plural character of constitutional
publics; and (e) the theoretical instruments that
enable us to capture the complex character of
democratic constitution-making.
2.1. Constitutionalism and democratic
legitimacy
Constitution is one of the key concepts of
our political vocabulary, and as such, there is
no scarcity of conceptions of the constitution.
These are tuned to (a) different tasks assigned
to the constitution (political, legal, historical);
(b) different institutional foundations (where the
issue of state-based foundation is the most im-
portant); and (c) the different normative con-
ceptions that the constitution can be associated
with (among others, liberal, communitarian, dis-
cursive).5  Having said that, it seems to us that
there is an especially close connection between
the idea of a constitution and (a) the critical
normative legitimacy of the procedure through
which it is elaborated, and (b) the democratic
framing of the substantive norms which are in-
cluded in the fundamental law. That the consti-
tution should be democratic is an intrinsic part
of Europeans constitutional grammar (from
their national constitutions). Laeken was the
most explicit and symbolically visible case thus
far of the infusion of this grammar into the EUs
constitutional language. The first lesson we can
draw from the Laeken experience is that the
close association between constitutionalism and
democratic legitimacy also has to apply to the
European level.
At first glance, the constitutionalisation of
the EU appears as among the least favourable
instances to forge such a special connection
between constitutionalism and democratic legiti-
macy. After all, the EU has emerged as a polity
with a set of material constitutional norms which
have been distilled from the national constitu-
tional traditions. The process was far from
democratic. It combined an inter-governmen-
tal, diplomatic-style negotiation of international
treaties, with the elucidation of the commonality
of constitutional traditions and interpretation of
the Treaties through judicial rulings (this was
mainly undertaken by the European Court of
Justice). In brief, the EU seems to provide am-
munition to the advocates of the normative and
functional superiority of evolutionary vis-à-vis
overt constitutionalism. If the EU already has a
constitution despite the fact that such a consti-
tution is more properly said to have evolved than
to have been established, how can we claim that
the Laeken process (which, after all, is quite
likely to fail) proves the special connection be-
tween the idea of a constitution and of a demo-
cratically legitimate process of constitution-
making?
The reason does not refer to the result, that
is, whether the Laeken process bears constitu-
tional fruit or not. Rather, the signalling of a
constitutional moment in Europe reveals the lim-
its of evolutionary constitutionalism, and the
political mobilising power of the normative con-
ception of the constitution.
First, the fact that even in the EU a constitu-
tional moment is found to be normatively and
functionally necessary in the first place clearly
proves the limits in reducing the constitution to
the set of norms which design institutions, de-
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vise decision-making procedures, and vindicate
fundamental rights. The EU is a political com-
munity with a high density of constitutional
norms, perhaps with the highest constitutional
density in the world. Of notable importance is
further that the EU has been grounded on the
basis of what was common to the national con-
stitutional traditions of the Member States. As
already suggested, such norms were partially
spelled out in the founding Treaties of the Eu-
ropean Communities, although then only in a
fragmentary and unsystematic manner. This cre-
ated the conditions under which courts, and very
especially the European Court of Justice, were
implicitly assigned with the task of clarifying
the normative implications of such common
constitutional traditions in the concrete politi-
cal and economic context of the process of Eu-
ropean integration. Several rounds of Treaty
amendment further contributed to the specifi-
cation of national constitutional traditions. How-
ever, the more the material constitutional norms
of the EU were concretised, the more they
framed the process of European integration, and
consequently also affected national constitu-
tional norms, the more problematic it was to
establish the democratic legitimacy of such
norms, because the appeal that could be made
to the democratic legitimacy of each national
constitutional tradition as grounding European
material constitutional norms was increasingly
reduced. This reverse legitimacy relation, com-
bined with the sustained expansion of the
breadth and depth of the powers of the EU, is at
the root of the democratic legitimacy problems
of the EU, generally referred to as the demo-
cratic deficit of the EU. Such a concern has
emerged as the major impetus towards the writ-
ing of a European Constitution through a
normatively sound constitution-making proc-
ess.6  Much of the democratic impetus for this
process emanated from the reliance on the con-
stitutional grammar that Europeans were so fa-
miliar with.
It is important to notice that such an impe-
tus has been basically contrary to the will of
many of the representatives of national govern-
ments, which in most cases have aimed at coun-
tering, delaying or constraining such an impe-
tus. This democratising pressure has been ex-
pressed in rather unarticulated albeit sustained
form, and can be seen at work in the growing
resistance to Treaty amendments since
Maastricht. However, its persistence does ex-
plain why, despite their reluctance and despite
major electoral risks, national governments have
embarked on the Laeken process, and why such
a process, despite all its shortcomings, has re-
sulted in a wider democratisation of the Treaty
writing process than was originally envisaged
(certainly further than envisaged in the Laeken
Declaration). What the Laeken process demon-
strates is that even with regard to a set of mate-
rial constitutional norms evolved through a proc-
ess whereby the EU distilled these from the
commonalities of national constitutional tradi-
tions, a process which indirectly could draw on
the legitimacy of national constitutional norms,
the normative legitimacy of EU norms would
not be sustainable, in the long run, without an
overt process of constitution-making through
which citizens could re-appropriate such norms.
It is not obvious that a democratically written
European constitution would radically depart
in substantive terms from the present set of
material constitutional norms. However, in
democratic legitimacy terms, there would be a
major difference, precisely because of the dif-
ferent procedures of elaboration. This shows that
evolutionary constitutionalism, particularly in
a constitutionally saturated context is bound to
reach its integrative limits. Sooner or later, the
democratic writing of the fundamental norms
of the political community will forge its way.
Second, the Laeken process further proves
that the political mobilising power of the term
constitution depends on its close association
with the normative conception of a democrati-
cally written constitution. It was such an asso-
ciation that the Laeken Convention relied on to
appropriate and alter the mandate established
in the Laeken Declaration, and it was on such a
basis that the conventionnels who were in fa-
vour of producing one single proposal which
would not only consolidate but also innovate
the existing material constitutional norms man-
aged to win the high ground in the Convention.
And it is on the basis of such an association that
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the partisans of ratification actually fight the
national battles of ratification. 7
In conclusion, what the Laeken process is a
clear indicator of (and here is the first constitu-
tional lesson we would like to draw) is of the
fact that any constitution-making process, even
if relying on the democratic legitimacy of na-
tional constitutions, cannot proceed according
to an exclusive logic of evolutionary constitu-
tionalism.
2.2. The sovereign character of the pouvoir
constituant
One of the most vexing questions in consti-
tutional theory is whether there are limits to the
pouvoir constituant. The Laeken constitution-
making process demonstrates that the sover-
eignty and radical originality of processes of
constitution-making should not be equated with
an unlimited, unbridled power.
On the one hand, the very idea of drafting
the fundamental law which constitutes a com-
munity of already constitutionalised nation-
states implies that the constitution-making ex-
ercise should not be characterised as something
radically new and unlimited, but instead as an
exercise aimed at a further concretisation of the
normative principles which underpin the com-
mon constitutional traditions. Not that each na-
tional constitutional tradition could trump, on
its own, any potential substantive character to
be included in the European constitution, but
that the constitutional traditions, as what is com-
mon to them, should be seen as establishing
constitutional mandates to the European con-
stitution.
On the other hand the Laeken process has
made apparent the degree to which national con-
stitutions have become Europeanised. National
constituent powers are now also bounded by the
basic normative principles enshrined in Euro-
pean law, and made to correspond with com-
mon national constitutional traditions. This does
not impinge upon their sovereignty, because of
the way they have become bounded: in the ex-
ercise of the common national constitutional
traditions. But it is simply ludicrous to depict
such power as radically unlimited. Moreover,
we can see patterns of synchronisation and con-
stitutional cross-fertilisation, outstanding among
which is the decision to subject constitutional
reform to the constitutional decision of other
Member States. In conclusion, the very limits
to the constituent power are the ones which turn
into constituent.8
2.3. The procedural character of
constitution-making
The third main lesson which can be drawn
from the writing of a European Constitution is
that constitution-making is a procedural affair,
which does not fit with one of the components
of the widely held association between consti-
tution and nation-state, namely that the consti-
tution is to be regarded as the most perfect ex-
pression of a pre-existing collective will, whose
mouthpiece will be peoples representatives, and
which should be subject afterwards to the
plebiscitarian endorsement by We the People (a
people which pre-dates the constitution itself).
The Laeken process proves this conception to
be misleading, both when applied to the national
and to the supra-national constitutions.
On what regards the latter, the constitu-
tionalisation of a community made up of consti-
tutionalised political communities cannot but be
depicted in procedural terms. The no-demos
thesis is wrong in its implications, but not in its
description of the in-existence of a pre-consti-
tuted constitutional will among Europeans. Such
a will can only emerge if forged through a proc-
ess in which multiple national and supra-na-
tional publics are active, and intervene accord-
ingly. What the no-demos thesis is wrong in is
in not realising that the constitution-making
process can be the catalyst of a common iden-
tity, which is the product, not the precondition,
of the exercise of constitution-making power.
On what concerns nation-states, the Laeken
process has contributed to falsify the romantic
conception, and add credence to the notion that
it was never correct. The very process of Euro-
pean constitution-making has obliged Europe-
ans to revisit their own national constitutional
trajectories, and to realize that all instances of
national constitution-making have been proce-
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dural affairs. The same applies, perhaps even
more strongly, to the future, to the convenience
of further proceduralising national constitu-
tional reform processes. The very ratification
of the Constitutional Treaty has pushed Euro-
peans into rather uncharted constitutional terri-
tory, that is, of having to conceive of proper
national constitutional provisions regarding the
relationships between European and national
constitutional law, and of having to subject the
effectiveness of their constituent power to the
effective exercise of the respective constituent
power of other Member States.
2.4. Multiple European Constitutional Publics
The fourth lesson to be distilled from the
process of European constitution-making con-
cerns the soundness of a key component in the
association between constitution and nation-
state, namely the characterisation of constitu-
tion-making as something momentous, its iden-
tification with a decision adopted at a specific
point in time. This is misleading. European con-
stitution-making involves multiple constitu-
tional publics, and it cannot be reduced to the
image of the constitutional moment in which
the will of a pre-constituted people is enshrined
in one stroke into the law. There is one point at
which things get decided, but it must be pre-
ceded by a rich and complex process.
The concrete constitutional will which is fi-
nally implemented never exists prior to the con-
stitution-making process. Citizens might have
quite concrete constitutional complaints and
criticisms, and also hold highly concrete and
strongly held constitutional preferences. More
often however these will be unarticulated or re-
late to quite general constitutional principles.
Further articulation and specification takes place
when confronted with the complaints, prefer-
ences and arguments of fellow citizens, through
facing the particular constitutional wills of other
citizens. Note that within a setting of multiple
constitutional publics, when a constitution-mak-
ing process is sparked in motion it is likely to
multiply the number of questions and to increase
uncertainty. A deliberatively designed consti-
tution-making process will then help to contract
the range of views, foster common under-
standings and framing of issues, and bring the
parties closer together  at times to full agree-
ment.9  When functioning as deliberative a proc-
ess of constitution-making produces delibera-
tively filtered preferences.
The challenge for such a system of multiple
constitutional publics, then, is to develop the best
possible combination of representative and di-
rect deliberative and decision-making logics. If
successful, such a polity may ensure a better
testing of democratic legitimacy, as more opin-
ions and viewpoints are vindicated, and more
arguments are aired. Such an optimal combina-
tion has to balance the need for proper public
sanction of the end result, with the need to maxi-
mize learning and reflexivity throughout the
process.
Focusing on the European process, multi-
plicity has been enhanced by the addition to
strong and general publics of the further layer
of differentiation between European and na-
tional publics. Such complexity is often held up
as a challenge to democracy. This would clearly
be the case if we consider the process in rela-
tion to the classical approach to representation,
or what Jane Mansbridge calls promissory rep-
resentation.10  However, such representation is
simply inadequate at the European level. This
agent-structure notion of representation presup-
poses a clear mandate which can steer the proc-
ess and which the voters can assess the result
up against. As could be expected from a proc-
ess steeped within the context of multiple con-
stitutional publics, the Laeken mandate was very
large and inchoate and only indirectly reflected
the constitutional will of European citizens. As
such it was also unable to offer citizens a clear
and definitive set of criteria by which to assess
the result. Through the Convention, which saw
itself more as a Constitutional Assembly than
as a preparatory body for the Intergovernmen-
tal Conference (albeit formally only designed
as a preparatory body), the Laeken mandate was
further democratised  even against the will of
resistant national governments. Thus, part of the
fourth lesson is that the representative model
that we can discern from Laeken  insofar as
Laeken can be labelled representative in the first
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place  did not rest foremost on a promissory
conception of representation but more on an
anticipatory  deliberative  mode of represen-
tation. This model is such designed as to foster
mutual learning and reflexivity throughout the
process. Accountability is ensured through an
ongoing interaction between strong and general
publics throughout the entire process. Antici-
patory representation sees representatives as
catalysts and facilitators, and where representa-
tives seek to anticipate voters preferences. One
of the main shortcomings of Laeken is that the
process was such set up as to compel Conven-
tion representatives to focus so much of their
energies on anticipating the governments re-
sponses over those of the citizens. Representa-
tives of national governments were influential
conventionnels, and the Intergovernmental Con-
ference mediated between the Convention and
the ratification stage.
On the importance of anticipatory represen-
tation Laeken is hardly atypical. National demo-
cratic constitution-making is also set up to tap
the deliberative merits of representation. Look-
ing back to national constitutional making from
the standpoint of Laeken, one can realise the
extent to which this was also part of such na-
tional processes. There was also there a vital
interplay between the public sphere based in
civil society and institutionalised will-formation,
with both of these components essential to popu-
lar sovereignty.11
2.5. Designing proper theoretical instruments
to properly caption constitution-making
The fifth lesson which can be drawn from
the Laeken process corresponds to the delinea-
tion of the specific procedures through which a
common constitutional will is forged and tested,
or to put it differently, of the specific procedures
through which multiple publics forge a common
constitutional will.
To the phases of drafting and ratification,
which are usually mapped by constitutional
theory, we have to add signalling, and two de-
liberative phases, which precede and follow the
drafting by strong publics of a constitutional
proposal. In more concrete terms, this means
that the process has to be set up with several
distinct stages. It has to test whether there ex-
ists a general democratic will to forge a consti-
tution; it has to authorise a strong public to act
on this, within a given mandate; this strong pub-
lic must be well and closely connected to the
general public throughout the process of con-
stitution-making; and the latter should have the
last word either in focused general elections or
through a referendum. Such a process-based
approach seeks to balance systems of represen-
tation so that accountability rests not merely on
a dyadic relation between representative and
voter but even more so, on the overall delibera-
tive quality of the process.
These five distinct phases allow us to cap-
ture in theoretical terms the multifaceted char-
acter of constitution-making, the third and fourth
lessons just referred to, which generally escape
the lens of constitutional theory.
3. A normative model of deliberative
democratic constitution-making
In the previous section we have recon-
structed the Laeken process and drawn consti-
tutional lessons from it. These are relevant and
enduring lessons whether the Constitutional
Treaty will finally be ratified or whether it will
end up as raw material for historians special-
ised in European integration. In this section, we
put forth a model of constitution-making which
draws on such lessons and incorporates them
into a normative model.
3.1. The constitution as the norm grounding
the democratic legitimacy of the legal
order
The guiding premise of such a normative
model is that constitutions as the set of funda-
mental norms of a given legal order play a key
role in grounding the democratic legitimacy of
the whole legal order. The democratic legitimacy
of the constitution-making process and of sub-
stantive constitutional norms render possible for
citizens to see themselves as authors, not only
subjects, of the laws. This is so because demo-
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cratic constitutional norms irradiate democratic
legitimacy to the whole legal order, thanks to the
combination of their hierarchical superiority
(stemming from the very differentiation between
constitution and ordinary states, and their nor-
mative credentials. This can be said to be the
more abstract and theoretical formulation of the
first lesson we derived from the Laeken process.
First, when constitutional norms trump or-
dinary norms on account of the latter being in
conflict with the former, hierarchical superior-
ity is not only infusing coherence, but also
democratic legitimacy, into the whole legal or-
der. The conflict is, simultaneously, one between
a superior and an inferior norm, and also one
between a norm decided by We the People, and
one decided by the ordinary law-making proc-
ess, which can only be legitimate if proceeding
within the framework of what citizens, as con-
stitutional authors, have decided.
Second, the democratic legitimacy of con-
stitutional norms establishes a prima facie case
for a general obligation to obey the whole set
of legal norms, which is hard to ground in the
absence of democratic constitutional norms.
Indeed, the key question here is precisely the
split between constitutional norms and ordinary
statutes. The democratic legitimacy of a non-
constitutionalised legal order hinges on the
democratic legitimacy of each and every legal
norm; but if this is so, then the demands on the
public autonomy of citizens will overtax their
private autonomy. On the contrary, a proper
differentiation between constitution and ordi-
nary statutes allows us to reconcile the demo-
cratic imperative with the normative proper-
ties of a proper division of labour between citi-
zens and their democratic representatives. Such
division is operationalised by means of com-
bining the hierarchical superiority of the con-
stitution with the assignment to the fundamen-
tal law of the legitimacy burden of the whole
legal order.
Consequently, any normative model of con-
stitution-making portrays a process of overt and
intentional constitutionalisation, which is de-
signed so as to equip the constitution with the
necessary democratic legitimacy, which can then
be irradiated to the whole legal order, on ac-
count of the hierarchical superiority of consti-
tutional norms.
3.2. The limits of the constituent power
In that sense, the model stands in contrast to
the processes of evolutionary constitutionalism,
where the material constitution emerges through
a slow process in which legislative and judicial
decisions cumulate over time so as to establish
a new legal order, or to actually change the con-
tents of the material constitution.12  This does
not mean that the constituent power should not
be inspired, and even draw lessons, from the
previous process of evolutionary constitution-
alism. To the extent that such a process has been
infused with the logic of progressive democra-
tisation of constitutional norms, the constituent
power is bound to reconstitute the legal order,
more than to constitute it anew.
3.3. The process of constitution-making:
the operational implications of multiple
publics
At any rate, constitution-making must be
conceived of as a process that must extend over
a certain, yet circumscribed, period of time in
order to actually forge and test the common con-
stitutional will. This is so not only because de-
liberative democracy is based on a procedural
conception of democracy, but also because the
formation of a democratic constitution requires
several steps and tests, through which a collec-
tive constitutional will is ascertained. Indeed,
constitutional norms enjoy what may be termed
reinforced democratic legitimacy because they
have been developed through particularly ardu-
ous procedures. It is only by means of a proper
process of clarification, filtering and testing dif-
ferences that the conclusion can be drawn that a
constitutional will actually exists.
Any political act, and obviously also the
writing or amending of the constitution, is an
intentional act, but whether the initiators inten-
tions correspond to the general constitutional
will is something that can only be ascertained if
assessed and tested through procedures that re-
quire considerable time; even more if such in-
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tentions reflect, as is always the case, a vision
whose spelling out requires the exchange of ar-
guments and the testing of preferences. Demo-
cratic constitution-making cannot be reduced to
an isolated or unique moment in time, a con-
ception proper to decisionistic, populist and
authoritarian conceptions of the constitution.13
But it can also not be portrayed as an unending
process, something, which would refer back to
the evolutionary conception of the constitution
just referred to.
Our designation of democratic constitution-
making in process terms is democratically
founded. First, we have already argued that con-
stitutional norms can be said to prevail over or-
dinary statutes if they can exhibit stronger
democratic credentials; we will like to add that
such credentials can only be established if the
political will behind such norms is not only a
reflection of a broad social majority, but also
of a consistent majority over (constitution-mak-
ing) time. Second, the fact that the constitution
typically enshrines a set of universalistic prin-
ciples and only the political communitys most
basic ethical choices, reinforces the need for
constitution-making to take place through an
ongoing process, and not through a mere (one-
shot) decision. It is particularly important to test
that constitutional norms are supported also by
what in a normal political process are minority
positions. After all, the obligation of all citi-
zens to obey ordinary statutes could only be
established by statutes that are in compliance
with the constitutional framework, which all
citizens have accepted, and therefore, turned
into their own.
The main operational implication of such
premises is that the democratic process of con-
stitution-making can be reconstructed around
five main phases, which are critical to the proper
testing of preferences, and to the emergence of
a strong constitutional will. The different phases
can be construed as a set of increasingly de-
manding tests, designed to foster a common will
in favour of constitution-making or reform, both
in terms of consistency (support must converge
around a single constitutional proposal) and in
terms of intensity (support must be as large as
possible, verging on supermajorities).
All this entails that the democratic process
of forging a legitimate constitution must adhere
to two central logics: deliberation and decision-
making. Deliberation, both in strong and in gen-
eral publics, stimulates inputs, fashioning and
vetting of proposals and forging of views, opin-
ions and stances, thus opening of the process,
whereas decision-making ensures choice
among alternatives and thus closure of the proc-
ess. These two logics play into the process in
different ways, so as to forge both opening and
closing of it. The ideal process will have to os-
cillate between these two logics. Similarly, an
adequate interplay between strong and general
publics is essential for the legitimacy creden-
tials of the constitution-making process to come
to fruition.
a) Phase 1: The signalling phase
The signalling phase basically corresponds
to the initiative to launch the constitution-mak-
ing process. Some individual, group or faction
must articulate latent social claims in terms of a
request to change constitutional norms. This
phase is necessary in any process of conscious,
overt constitution-making. Otherwise, the proc-
ess is implicit, not explicit, and does not qualify
as a genuine constitutional moment.
The signalling has something of an
enunciative character, as those signalling claim
to articulate a diffuse feeling within the com-
munity, while the very act of signalling might
contribute to create the momentum for such an
initiative. The notion of signalling itself has a
certain top down logic. But this is not uncon-
strained or unauthorised leadership because
those signalling have to provide reasons and
justifications for the claim to be speaking in the
name of We the People. Nevertheless, the indi-
vidual or group signalling the constitutional
moment only has a claim to articulate a diffuse
social feeling, whereas this claim has then to be
redeemed by means of eliciting wide public sup-
port as early as possible in the process. The proc-
ess is such designed as to ensure this.
Those claiming that the people wants to make
a new constitution or amend the present one must
come up with answers to three basic questions:
258 John Erik Fossum / Agustín José Menéndez
(1) Why forge or amend the constitution?; (2)
Why do it now?; and (3) How to do it?
b) Phase 2: The initial deliberative phase
The second, initial deliberative, phase, is
where the arguments put forth in favour of con-
stitutional change are tested and transformed into
platforms for constitutional reform. This phase
is justified for the obvious reason that to raise
the claim that the people want a new constitu-
tion is very different from redeeming such a
claim. The initial deliberative phase is precisely
where (a) the claim raised by those launching
the constitution-making process is put to the test
of public opinion, and (b) where an agenda for
constitutional reform starts to take shape.
The process is actually put in motion, if or
insofar as, the emerging platform receives gen-
eral public endorsement. This phase is needed
in order to ensure that the signalling initiative is
properly debated not only in strong, but also in
general publics, and after this a common will
starts to be formed.
At the end of phase two, either the process
fails, and thus comes to an end, or it results in a
decision to proceed with the debate on the con-
crete contents of the constitutional reform. How
to ensure that there is such a widespread social
demand?
a) A standard case is that of a landslide elec-
toral victory for the party or the parties that
stand for constitutional change. This is the
direct political or ideological approach.
b) Another option is what we may label top-
down solicitation of support. This can ema-
nate from the claims that strong publics set
forth for constitutional reform. This is an in-
direct approach, in which strong publics take
on to serve as proxies for the population.
c) A third option is top-down solicitation of
support through for instance public opinion
polls.
Bruce Ackerman, in his leading study on the
constitutionalism of the United States, highlights
the first option. This majoritarian model is clearly
the most robust means of obtaining popular sup-
port. It is also the option that most explicitly
draws on promissory representation. Its
majoritarian and potentially highly ideological
character (think for example of the major reforms
of the American social and economic tissue in
the early 1980s) can however also be a limita-
tion, as there is no assurance that it will be a
consensually based mandate (see Ackerman,
1991; 1998). When this option is chosen, the
subsequent stages must be devised in such a way
as to foster such a consensus. Hence this option
also has a strong deliberative component.
The second option is based on a weaker
mode of popular consultation, but a potentially
less conflictive one. The options main weak-
ness is its inability to offer adequate proof that
the popular assembly actually speaks for the
people. If this option is chosen, the model logic
requires that the subsequent stages ensure that
such consultation is properly ensured. Here
more extensive deliberation akin to that of an-
ticipatory representation is presupposed.
The third option is incompatible with the
model as opinion polls are ephemeral and unre-
liable in ensuring adequate information on peo-
ples constitutional desires.
The second phase is brought to an end with
an institutional decision to prepare a draft con-
stitutional project. This explains why low pub-
lic mobilisation in favour of constitution-mak-
ing could be compensated for, at least tempo-
rarily, by representative institutions (strong pub-
lics) committing themselves to constitutional
reform. The latter could claim that, despite the
absence of an adequate signal that there is a
popular will to reform the constitution, such a
will still exists and could become visible from
Phase Three onwards. The democratic validity
of such a claim is then critically dependent on
the representativeness of the relevant strong
public(s) involved.
c) Phase 3: The drafting phase
The third is a drafting phase, in which a spe-
cific form of strong publics (typically an assem-
bly or convention) develops and agrees on a
draft of the new or amended constitution. The
purpose of this phase is to establish a constitu-
tional proposal, to move from the strong but
unstructured common constitutional will of the
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second phase, to the formation of a common will
around a precise constitutional proposal.
On the character of the strong public, three
main options at least can be identified. The first
is a specially convened Constitutional Assem-
bly or Constitutional Convention made up
of popularly elected representatives, and man-
dated to draft a constitutional proposal. The key
defining feature of such a body is that its mem-
bers have been elected by citizens on the basis
of their constitutional platforms, which reflects
a clear element of promissory representation.
The second option is an already existing body,
such as a chamber of Parliament, or a mixed
formation of the two chambers of Parliament,
with a resolve to draft a constitutional proposal.
In the absence of a popular mandate, their le-
gitimacy could be grounded on a landslide vic-
tory for a party or parties favouring constitu-
tional reform; organisationally speaking, the key
issue is that their constitutional labours would
be given priority, if not exclusive attention, al-
lowing them to detach themselves from concrete
ordinary questions to have the time and energy
to reflect on constitutional issues. This forma-
tion relies on an initial element of promissory
representation (through the electoral channel)
but where this is subsequently interspersed with
a stronger component of anticipatory represen-
tation  and which also presupposes that the
body establish very strong links with the pub-
lic. The third is to form an ad hoc body whose
composition would reflect, fully or partially, the
will of popular representatives (i.e., Members
of Parliament).
Such an assembly must see itself as having
a direct sanction from the people. Direct,
unmediated representation is necessary with
reference to the usual understanding of the prin-
ciple of legality, but even more so, on what con-
cerns the drafting of the fundamental law. In its
strongest version this implies that the Conven-
tions composition be determined through a di-
rect, polity-wide election (see the first and per-
haps also the second option). A weaker version
would entail election by strong publics (could
be used in the second and third options). Cer-
tainly, in case of low popular mobilisation, and
absent an adequate signal, direct polity-wide
election would be very much needed to redeem
the claim that the people wants to write or amend
the constitution. The general principle could be
stated as follows: the weaker the signal, the
greater the need, to obtain direct popular sup-
port at this critical stage of the process.
Further, the assembly must have a clear un-
derstanding that the mandate is to write a con-
stitution. Only in such a case would there be
assurance that the public deliberations preced-
ing the election (by the people or by the strong
public representing the people) be focused on
candidates ideas and views on the concrete
exercise and drafting of the constitution.
The activities of the strong public are aimed
at establishing agreement on a specific consti-
tutional project. The original platform of con-
stitutional reform is considered in depth, on the
basis of the deliberations of the representative
institution itself, and on the input which comes
from civil society, expressed in phase two, and
which keeps on circulating from general to
strong publics in this phase.
The process must be such devised as to find
a balance between forging a coherent common
will and openness to general publics. This can
only be ensured through proper transparency.
The strong public has to be closely attentive to
the proposals and reactions of general publics 
which serve as critical tests of the emerging
constitutional proposal.
The work of the assembly/convention ends
when a draft constitution is put forth. But con-
trary to what is the case in ordinary political
processes, the existence of a coherent will on
the side of the strong publics is not enough to
turn the proposal into constitutional norms: fur-
ther tests of the common constitutional will are
to be conducted in phases four and five. The
aspect of decision-making within this strong
public is confined to the making of a proposal,
and does not include the turning of the proposal
into constitutional norms proper.
d) Phase 4: The agenda-settled
deliberative phase
The fourth is a central deliberative phase,
in which general publics engage in further de-
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liberation, this time around the concrete agenda
provided by the draft constitutional proposal.
The pros and cons of the different contents of
the new constitutional text are considered, with
a view to determine whether the people should
or should not endorse the new constitution. This
corresponds once again to the needed interplay
between institutionalised deliberative process
and informally developed public opinion.14
For this to strictly comply with promissory
representation there would have had to be full
consensus on a constitutional draft at the out-
set. Since this is unlikely, this phase also pre-
supposes that the strong publics interact closely
with civil society, in line with the anticipatory
mode of representation. Here, as always when
the anticipatory mode is involved, it is impor-
tant to prevent manipulation and top-down or-
chestration of views and positions. Therefore,
whereas strong publics need to be active and
help spark debate, they cannot in themselves
replace the legitimacy input stemming from ac-
tual deliberation in civil society. It goes without
saying that there is a difference between foster-
ing debate and co-opting civil society. This proc-
ess needs to continue long enough to allow the
public to assess the constitution in a proper
manner. If it is too short, accountability suffers,
whereas if it is too long, transparency might
suffer.
e) Phase 5: The endorsement phase
The fifth and final phase is endorsement or
ratification. The draft constitution is subjected
to a final vote by the people. We can think of
four main options, although there are many vari-
ants of each:
a) A polity-wide referendum (where different
majorities could be required: super-major-
ity, qualified majority or simple majority, and
different formulae applied in each case),
b) a polity-wide referendum combined with
strong publics ratification (also with differ-
ent possible concrete formulations: one is
to require a simple majority in the referen-
dum and qualified majority of the members
of the relevant representative assembly or
assemblies),
c) referenda in critical constituencies only (ref-
erendum à la carte in a federal or quasi fed-
eral context), supplemented with the en-
dorsement of representative institutions,
d) exclusive parliamentary ratification, which
can assign different roles and weights to dif-
ferent parliaments in a federal or quasi-fed-
eral context.
The need for a final popular sanction is in-
trinsic to the social function of law in modern
societies, which is to ensure social integration
by means of certain social norms apt to solve
conflicts and coordinate behaviour in order to
achieve social goals.15
The procedural model outlined here reflects
the notion that the legitimacy of a constitution
rests to a large extent on the richness and qual-
ity of the debate prior to voting,16  from the rea-
sons that move people to vote. However, for a
constitutional initiative to qualify as a demo-
cratic constitutional moment the procedure has
to include a final test of the common will to
adopt the constitution. The choice of procedure
also could depend on the magnitude of consti-
tutional change: the more comprehensive, the
more the need for referendum.
If the referendum form is chosen, it has to
be such set up to ensure that all those partaking,
consider themselves to make an unambiguous
decision in favour of or against a specific pro-
posal. Special efforts must be taken to avoid the
possibility for manipulation. The purpose is to
ensure, as far as possible, a common focus and
a common attention throughout the process.
4. Conclusion
In this article, we have drawn on political
and constitutional theory to shed light on the
EUs Constitutional Treaty. The Constitutional
Treaty has already become the object of a large
and rapidly growing number of commentaries
in the European studies literature. Most of these
tie the Treatys relevance and importance to its
actual ratification. Our analysis has had a some-
what different focus. We see the Laeken proc-
ess as a major experiment in constitution-mak-
ing, which holds important lessons. We derived
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five main lessons from this process, all of which
are independent of the Treatys ratification.
These speak to (1) the substantive connection
between constitution and democratic legitimacy
(no constitution without democratic legitimacy);
(2) the nature of the sovereign power in the
hands of the constituting power, or pouvoir con-
stituant, i.e. those who have the last word on
the enacting of the constitution (the sovereignty
of the pouvoir constituant is not coterminous
with fully discretionary political power); (3) the
procedural character of constitution-making,
which is clearly at odds with any romantic no-
tion of constitution-making in a decisionistic
sense (constitution-making is a complex and
multi-step process where the existence of a com-
mon constitutional will is tested); (4) the chal-
lenge of multiple publics and the implications
for political representation (both strong and
general publics play key roles in constitution-
making, and different conceptions of represen-
tation are relevant); and (5) the design (or the
reconstruction) of constitution-making reflects
both its procedural character and the multiplic-
ity of publics which intervene. Keeping such
lessons in mind, we proceeded to outline a nor-
mative model of constitution-making, which
seems to us to: (1) offer a rationale for how the
principle of legality can properly differentiate
between statutes and constitution; (2) assign to
the constitution the main legitimatory burden
of the legal order, and by such means, allow us
to establish an adequate balance between pub-
lic and private autonomy; and (3) distinguish
five clearly delineated phases in any process of
constitution-making, necessary in order to prop-
erly test the existence of a general constitutional
will. This design is set up to strike the best pos-
sible balance between constitution and democ-
racy, the two core components of modernity,
whose co-terminous existence and in-built ten-
sions are of such vital importance for how we
live our lives.
NOTES
1 Something which was not the case in 1953 (The Eu-
ropean Political Community) and 1984 (Spinelli
European Union). These precedents, even if precious
and direct forerunners of the present process, either
lacked any chance of succeeding or were seen as a
distant agreement among elites, not worthy of the
constitutional label.
2 Strong publics refer to institutionalised deliberations
whose discourse encompasses both opinion forma-
tion and decision making. In institutional terms,
strong publics allude to parliamentary assemblies
and discursive bodies in formally organised institu-
tions imbued with decision-making power, yet con-
strained by the logic of arguing and impartial justi-
fication. See Fraser 1992.
3 This chapter, as a good deal of our previous work
on European constitutionalism, has been inspired by
our reading of the seminal work of Bruce Ackerman
(1991; 1998; 1999) on the United States Constitu-
tion.
4 We have applied the model in Fossum and Menéndez
(2005).
5 On the European context, see Menéndez 2004.
6 This is the core message of the debate preceding
and immediately following the fiasco of the Nice
Intergovernmental Conference. See Closa (2002)
and Eriksen, Fossum and Menéndez (2004).
7 Occasionally, partisans of ratification might be far
from consistent. Thus, the Spanish government sub-
mitted the Constitutional Treaty to constitutional
screening by the Spanish Constitutional Court fol-
lowing the procedure foreseen for the constitutional
review of international treaties, while it presented
the Constitutional Treaty to the public as a Consti-
tution. This clearly proves inconsistency, but such
inconsistency supports, not undermines, our argu-
ment. If they were impelled to be inconsistent is be-
cause most citizens feel that the best reason to write
a constitution is to ensure the democratic legitimacy
of fundamental norms.
8 In that regard, see the French law amending the Con-
stitution, Loi constitutionnelle n° 2005204 of 1
March, 2005, Journal Officielle n° 51 of 2 March
2005, 3696, especially Article 3 : A compter de
lentrée en vigueur du traité établissant une Consti-
tution pour lEurope, le titre XV de la Constitution
est ainsi rédigé. We are tempted to draw a parallel-
ism with human language. The very rules which
govern it render possible a creative use of language.
9 There are many different categories of agreement:
from a mere compromise to a working agreement
and to a rational consensus (see Eriksen 2003).
10 Promissory representation works normatively
through the explicit and implicit promises that the
elected representative makes to the electorate. It
works prudentially through the sanction the voter
exercises at the next election (Time 3) (Mansbridge
2003, 516).
11 The difference with the European process is one of
degree, not of scale. At the national level, there is
usually a basic agreement on which constitution is
to be written, while at Laeken, there was a stark
conflict between which national constitutional tra-
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ditions should be emulated: the constitution as the
fundamental laws authored by the people viz. evo-
lutionary constitutionalism.
12 See Ackerman 1999. For a defence of EU evolu-
tionary constitutionalism, see Weiler 2003. The es-
tablishment of the democratic credentials of such
evolutionary processes is harder, if only because that
is cognitively more demanding.
13 Deliberative constitutionalism does not assume pre-
given public differences, but it does not conceive of
the process of deliberation as one of manufactur-
ing of consent, as leading social scientists did in
the 1920s and 1930s. On this, see for example
Lasswell (1998); for a critical analysis see Herman
and Chomsky (1988).
14 Habermas 1996, 298.
15 Habermas 1996, 139 and 145; Rawls 1971, 2689;
Honoré 1992, 117; 2002, 48995.
16 Habermas 1996, 32.
REFERENCES
Ackerman, Bruce (1991). We the People, volume I. Foun-
dations, Cambridge.
Ackerman, Bruce (1998). We the People, volume II.
Transformations, Cambridge.
Ackerman, Bruce (1999). Revolution on a Human Scale,
in: Yale Law Journal, 108(8), 22792349.
Closa, Carlos (2002). The Implicit Model of Constitu-
tion in the EU Constitutional Project, in: Erik
Oddvar Eriksen/John Erik Fossum/ Agustín José
Menéndez (eds.): Constitution-Making and Demo-
cratic Legitimacy, ARENA Report 8/02, Oslo, 53
74.
Eriksen, Erik Oddvar (2003), Integration and the Quest
for Consensus. On the Microfoundation of
Supranationalism, in: Erik Oddvar Eriksen/Chris-
tian Joerger/Jürgen Neyer (eds.): European Govern-
ance, Deliberation and the Quest for Democratisa-
tion, ARENA Report 2/03, Oslo, 159225.
Eriksen, Erik Oddvar/John Erik Fossum/Agustín José
Menéndez (eds.) (2004). Developing a Constitution
for Europe, London.
Fossum, John Erik/Agustín José Menéndez (2005). The
Constitutions Gift, European Law Journal, 11 (4),
380410.
Fraser, Nancy (1992). Rethinking the public sphere. A
contribution to the critique of actually existing de-
mocracy, in: Craig Calhoun (ed.): Habermas and the
Public Sphere, Cambridge, 109142.
Habermas, Jürgen (1996). Between Facts and Norms,
Cambridge/MA.
Herman, Edward S./Noam Chomsky (1988). Manufac-
turing Consent. The Political Economy of the Mass
Media, New York.
Honoré, Tony (1992). The Dependence of Morality on
Law, in: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13(1), 1
17.
Honoré, Tony (2002). The Necessary Connection be-
tween Law and Morality, in: Oxford Journal of Le-
gal Studies, 22(3), 48995.
Lasswell, Harold D. (1998). Propaganda, in: Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences, 520529.
Mansbridge, Jane (2003). Rethinking Representation,
in: American Political Science Review, 97(4), 515
528.
Menéndez, José (2004). Three Conceptions of the Euro-
pean Constitution, in: Erik Oddvar Eriksen/John Erik
Fossum/Agustín José Menéndez (eds.): Developing
a Constitution for Europe, London, 109128.
Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice, Cambridge.
Weiler, Joseph (2003). In defence of the status quo: Eu-
ropes constitutional Sonderweg, in: Joseph Weiler/
Marlene Wind (eds.): European Constitutionalism
beyond the State, Cambridge, 723.
AUTOREN
JOHN ERIK FOSSUM, Senior Researcher am
Forschungszentrum ARENA an der Universität Oslo,
Professor an der Universität Bergen. Mitherausgeber der
Routledge-Serie Democratizing Europe. Forschungs-
schwerpunkte umfassen die Konstitutionalisierung
Europas und demokratische Legitimität der EU.
Kontakt: ARENA Centre for European Studies,
University of Oslo, P.O.Box 1143 Blindern, N-0317
Oslo, Norway
E-Mail: j.e.fossum@arena.uio.no
AGUSTÍN JOSÉ MENÉNDEZ ist Ramón y Cajal
Researcher an der Universität León und CIDEL Research
Fellow bei ARENA. Gegenwärtig Visiting Fellow am
Constitutional Studies Centre, Madrid. Forschungs-
schwerpunkte: Verfassungsrecht und konstitutionelle
Politik Europeas, Finanzstruktur der Union.
Kontakt: ARENA Centre for European Studies,
University of Oslo, P.O.Box 1143 Blindern, N-0317
Oslo, Norway
E-mail: a.j.menendez@arena.uio.no
